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54 DIGIORGIO FRUIT CORP.
[Sac. No. 7279.

1).

DEPT. OF EMPLOYlIENT [56 C.2d

In Bank.

May 29, 1961.]

DI GIORGIO FRUIT CORPORATION (a Corporation),
Respondent, v. DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA et a1., Defendants
and Appellants.
[Sac. No. 7283.

In Bank.

May 29, 1961.]

THOMAS C. BOWERS, Respondent, v. DEPARTMENT
OF EMPLOYMENT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA et at, Defendants and Appellants; AGRICULTURAL WORKERS ORGANIZING COMMITTEE,
AFL-CIO (an Unincorporated Association), Intervener
and Appellant; ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG, as Secretary
of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Movant
and Appellant.
[1] Labor-Public Employment Service.-The Wagner-Peyser Act
(48 Stat. 113 (1933) as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 49-49n (1956»,
which has been accepted by this state (Unemp. Ins. Code,
§§ 2051,2052), governs the operation of the state employment
service.
[2] Appeal-Dismissal-Settlement of Controversy.-The appeal
of a petitioner for intervention will be dismissed where, in
view of the fact that the question of law involved has been
decided, no purpose would be served by determining whether
the trial court erred in denying him leave to intervene.
[S] Labor-Remedies-Appeal-Moot Questions.-In proceedings
in mandamus to compel the State Department of -Employment
to refer agricultural workers to petitioners' fruit ranches during a certain harvest season because a strike was in progress,
appeals from judgments directing that a writ of mandate
issue in each case, following a determination by the trial court
that a regulation of the United States Secretary of Labor
forbidding referrals in labor dispute situations was invalid,
should not be dismissed as moot, though the harvest season was
over, where the appeals presented a question of continuing
importance in the administration of the employment service,
the very shortness of harvest season would preclude appellate
review in mandate proceedings if the end of each season were
treated as rendering the appeals moot, and tIle public interest
[1] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Labor, § 40 et seq.
McX. Dig. References: [1,4-9] Labor, § 2.6; [2] Appeal and
Error, § 913; [3] Labor, § 30.5.
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[56 C.2d 54; 13 Cal.Rptr. 663; 362 P.2d "7)

[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

\\

compelled a present determination of the validity of the Secretary's regulation.
ld.-Public Employment Service.-Under the Wagner-Peyser
Act, creating the United States Employment Service to promote the establishment and maintenance of a national system of
public employment offices, it is the duty of the Employment
Service to assist in establishing and maintaining systems of
public employment offices in the several states and to assist in
coordinating such offices throughout the United States.
ld.-Public Employment Service-Referrals.-The operation of
an efficient employment service requires the formulation of reasonable referral standards so that prospective employees may
be referred to jobs for which they are suited and which are
suitable to them, and under the Wagner-Peyser Act, it is for
the United States Secretary of Labor to provide such standards. In doing so, he does not regulate the conditions of
employment or determine the qualifications of employees, but
he necessarily determines the conditions on which employers
or employees may receive the benefits of the publicly-supported
employment service.
ld.-Public Employment Service-Referrals.-Although the
United States Secretary of Labor may not, in his regulations
governing public employment offices, prevent an employer from
hiring an employee unsuited to a job, he may provide that no
referral shall be made in such case. Similarly, although he
may not regulate working conditions or wages, he may provide that no referrals shall be made to employers who maintain
unsafe or unsanitary places of employment or pay substandard
wages.
ld. - Public Employment Service - Referrals.-The United
State Secretary of Labor might determine to withhold the services of public employment offices in cases of strikes or lockouts
and leave it to employers to secure employees through other
channels, he might determine to continue referrals and leave
it to the individual employees to decide whether to accept or
reject jobs where a labor dispute existed, or he might adopt
some intermediate position.
ld.-Public Employment Service-Referrals.-By authorizing
and directing the United States Secretary of Labor "to provide for the giving of notice of strikes or lockouts to applicants
before they are referred to employment" (29 U.S.C. § l1(b»,
Congress did not define the full extent of the Secretary's rulemaking power with respect to referrals in the event of labor
disputes. Such statutory provision does not provide that the
Secretary must authorize referrals when there are strikes or
lockouts; it provides only that notice must be given before

56

DIGIORGIO FRUIT CORP. 11. DEPT. OF EMPLOYKENT

[56

C.2d

referrals are made, and only to this extent does it restrict the
rule-making power granted by § 12.
[9] ld.-Public Employment Service-Referrals.-In view of the
fact that the United States Secretary of Labor and his predecessors have consistently interpreted the Wagner-Peyser Act as
authorizing regulations with respect to referrals in the event
of labor disputes in addition to the minimum notice requirement of § l1(b), and such regulations have been in effect for
many years, consistent administrative construction of the
statute, particularly where it originated with those charged
with putting the statutory machinery into effect, is entitled to
great weight and will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous.

APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Courts of Yuba
County and Butte County and from an order of the Superior
Court of Butte County denying a petition for leave to intervene. Warren Steel and A. B. Ware, -Judges. Judgments
reversed; appeal from order dismissed; motion by respondent
in Sac. No. 7279 to dismiss appeal, denied.
Proceedings in mandamus to compel the Department of
Employment, its director and employees to refer agricultural
workers to petitioners' fruit ranches while a strike was in
progress during the 1960 harvest season. Judgments granting
writs, reversed.
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, B. Abbott Goldberg and
Charles A. Barrett, Assistant Attorneys General, Walter J.
Wiesner, Deputy Attorney General, and Maurice P. McCaffery, Chief Counsel, Department of Employment, for Defendants and Appellants.
Simonelli and Fransen and Nels B. Fransen for Intervener
and Appellant.
Laurence E. Dayton, United States Attorney, Charles Elmer
Collett, Assistant United States Attorney, Kenneth C. Robertson, Regional Attorney, and Altero D'Agostini, Attorney,
United States Department of Labor, for Movant and Appellant.
Laurence E. Dayton, United States Attorney, Charles
Elmer Collett, Assistant United States Attorney, Kenneth C.
Robertson, Regional Attorney, and Altero D'Agostini, Attorney, United States Department of Labor, as Amici Curiae on
behalf of Defendants and Appellants in No. 7279.
• A8signed by Chairman of Judicial Council.
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Marion B. Plant, Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, Rich,
Fuidge, Dawson & Marsh, Rich, Fuidge & Dawson, McCutchen, Doyle, Brown & Enersen, Raymond A. Leonard,
Hewitt & McBride and Loyd W. McCormick for Respondents.
Charles A. Rummell, Gerald H. Trautman and Gerald D.
Marcus as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondent in No. 7283.
TRAYNOR, J.-Petitioners, Di Giorgio Fruit Corporation
and Thomas C. Bowers, brought separate actions for writs
of mandate to compel respondents, the Department of Employment of the State of California and its director and
employees, to refer agricultural workers to petitioners' fruit
ranches during the harvest season in 1960. A strike called
by the Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee, AFLCIO, was in progress at each ranch. Pursuant to a regulation
of the United States Secretary of Labor1 issued under the
Wagner-Peyser Act (48 Stat. 113 (1933) as amended, 29
U.S.C.A. §§ 49-49n (1956» the department refused to refer
workers to petitioners for employment. [1] The WagnerPeyser Act, which has been accepted by this state (Unemp.
Ins. Code, §§ 2051, 2052), governs the operation of the state
employment service. In the Bowers case the trial court permitted the organizing committee to intervene on the side of
the department. It refused, however, to permit the Secretary
of Labor to intervene in support of his regulation. In each
case the trial court concluded that the regulation was invalid
and entered judgment directing that a writ of mandate issue.
The department and the individual respondents have appealed
from the judgment in each case, and the organizing committee has appealed from the judgment in the Bowers case.
The Secretary of Labor has appealed from the order denying
his petition for leave to intervene in the Bowers case.
[2] The Secretary of Labor contends that his interest
in the validity of his regulation is sufficient to support ~nter1" Beferro.'b '" ro.bor di8pvte ,it1UltiOfil. No person shall be referred
to a position the filling of whieh will aid direetly or indirectly in filling
a job which (1) is vacant because the former occupant is on strike or is
being locked out in the course of a labor dispute, or (2) the filling of
which is an issue in a labor dispute. With respeet to positions not covered by subparagraph (1) or (2) of this paragraph, any individual may
be referred to a place of employment in which a labor dispute exists,
provided he is given written notice of such dispute prior to or at the
time of his referral." (20 C.F.R., ~ 602.2(b) (Supp. 1960). See also
20 C.F.R., ~ 604.1(1) (Supp.1960).)
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vention (see C01mty of San BernarcUno v. Harsh Calif. Corp.,
52 Ca1.2d 341, 345-346 [340 P.2d 617]), and that therefore
the trial court erred in denying leave to intervene. Bowers
contends that the Secretary's intervention would have delayed
the action and that the need for a prompt decision in the
. trial court during the harvest season justified denial of the
Secretary's petition. The validity of the regulation presents
only a question of law on which the Secretary has been fully
heard on these appeals. Since we have now determined that
question and since any prejudice the Secretary may have
suffered from not being allowed to be heard in the trial court
cannot be undone, no purpose would be served by determining
whether the trial court erred in denying him leave to intervene. Accordingly, his appeal will be dismissed.
Di Giorgio has moved to dismiss the appeal taken from
the judgment in its favor on the ground that it is moot. It
points out that the harvest season is now over and contends
that the writ of mandate is therefore no longer operative.
Although there has been no motion in the Bowers case to dismiss the appeals, it would follow that they should be dismissed
if Di Giorgio's motion to dismiss is well-taken.
[3] We have concluded that the appeals from the judg- '
ments should not be dismissed as moot. Even if the writs
of mandate were operative only during the harvest season of
1960, the appeals present a question of continuing importance
in the administration of the employment service. The very
shortness of harvest seasons would preclude appellate review
in mandate proceedings if the end of each season were treated
as rendering the appeals moot. These are not cases in which
the parties are no longer interested in the legal issue involved
(see California Prune & Apricot Growers' Assn. v. Pomeroy
Orchard Co., 195 Cal. 264, 265-266 [232 P. 463]), and Di
Giorgio's suggestion that the issue could be determined in a
declaratory relief action demonstrates that there is a continuing controversy ripe for decision. No purpose but delay
would be served by dismissing the appeals, and the public
interest both in the operation of the employment service and
in the orderly administration of justice compels a determination now of the validity of the Secretary's regulation.
(See In re Newbern, 55 Ca1.2d 500, 505 [11 Cal.Rptr. 547,
360 P.2d 43] ; Almassy v. Los Angeles County Civil Service
Com., 34 Ca1.2d 387, 390 [210 P.2d 503] ; Kirstowsky v. Superior Court, 143 Cal.App.2d 745, 749 [300 P.2d 163] ; Terry
v. Civil Service Commission, 108 Cal.App.2d 861, 872 [240
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P.2d 691] ; Rattray v: Scuddm', 67 Ca1.App.2d 123, 127-128
[153 P.2d 433].)
[ 4] The Wagner-Peyser Act, enacted in 1933 (48 Stat .
. 113), created the United States Employment Service to promote the establishment and maintenance of a national system
of public cmployment offices. It is the duty of the Employment Service to assist in establishing and maintaining systems
of public employment offices in the several states and to assist
in coordinating such offices throughout the United States.
The act provides for grants of federal funds to states that
wish to receive its benefits by operating their own employment offices in cooperation with the United States Employment Service. States wishing to receive such funds must
submit plans of operation to the Secretary of Labor, and he
is authorized to certify to the Secretary of the Treasury for
payment necessary operating funds to each state that has an
approved unemployment compensation law in compliance with
the act. Section 9 provides that it shall be the duty of the
Secretary of Labor to ascertain whether the system of public
employment offices maintained in each state is conducted in
accordance with the rules and regulations and the standards
of efficiency prescribed by him under the act. Section 11 (a)
provides for the establishment of a "Federal Advisory Council composed of men and women representing employers and
employees in equal numbers and the public for the purpose
of formulating policies and discussing problems relating to
employment and insuring impartiality, neutrality, and freedom from political influence in the solution of such problems. "
(29 U.S.C.A. § 49j(a) (1956).) It also provides for the establishment of similar state advisory councils. Section 11 (b)
provides that "In carrying out the provision of" the act
"the Secretary is authorized and directed to provide for the
giving of notice of strikes or lockouts to applicants before
they are referred to employment" (29 U.S.C.A. § 49j(b)
(1956) ), and section 12 provides that" The Secretary of Labor
is authorized to make such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions of" the act. (29 U.S.C.A.
§ 49k (1956).) Pursuant to this authority the Secretary
adopted the regulation challenged in these cases providing
that "No person shall be referred to a position the filling
of which will aid directly or indirectly in filling a job which
(1) is vacant because the former occupant is on strike or is
being locked out in the course of a labor dispute, or (2) the
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filling of which is an issue in a labor dispute." (20 C.F.R.
§ 602.2 (b) (Supp. 1960).)
. [5] The operation of an efficient employment service
obviously requires the formulation of reasonable referral
standards so that prospective employees may be referred to
jobs for which they are suited and which are suitable to them.
Under section 12 it is for the Secretary to provide such standards. In doing so, he does not regulate the conditions of
employment or determine the qualifications of employees, but
he necassarily determines the conditions on which employers or
employees may receive the benefits of the publiely-supported
employment service. [ 6 ] Thus, although he may not prevent an employer from hiring an employee unsuited to a job,
he may provide that no referral shall be made in such a case.
Similarly, although he may not regulate working conditions
or wages, he may provide that no referrals shall be made to
employers who maintain unsafe or unsanitary places of employment or pay substandard wages. (See 41 Ops. U.S. Atty.
Gen. No. 74 (1959).) Section 12 likewise authorizes the Secretary to determine how the policy of neutrality stated in
section l1(a) can best be served. ['1] He might determine
to withhold the services of the public employment offices in
eases of strikes or lockouts and leave it to employers to secure
employees through other channels, he might determine to
continue referrals and leave it to the individual employees to
decide whether to aecept or reject jobs where a labor dispute
existed, or he might adopt some intermediate position. (SE"e
Virginia Electric etc. Co. v. National Labor Relations Board.
319 U.S. 533, 539-540 [63 8.Ct. 1214, 87 L.Ed. 1568] ; Fahey
v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 249-250 [67 S.Ct. 1552, 91 L.Ed.
2030]; Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 542-543 [72 S.Ct.
525, 96 L.Ed. 547] ; American P. ct L. Co. v. Securities <f
E. Com., 329 U.S. 90, 104-105, 112 [67 S.Ct. 133, 91 L.Ed.
103] ; American TruckiflfJ Assns. v. Uflited States, 344 U.S.
298,310-311 [73 S.Ct. 307, 97 L.Ed. 337] ; 1 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, § 5.03, p. 302.)
[8] Petitioners contend, however, that by authorizing
and directing the Secretary "to provide for the giving of
notice of strikes or lockouts to applicants before they are
referred to employment" (§ n(b» Congress defined the full
extent of the Secretary's rule-making power with respect
to referrals in the event of labor disputes. We cannot agree
with this contention. Section 11 (b) does not provide that the
Secretary must authorize referrals when there are strikes
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or lockouts. It provides only that notice must be given before
referrals are made, and only to this extent does it restrict
the rule-making power granted by section 12. (See American
Trucking Assns. v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 316 [73 S.Ct.
307, 97 L.Ed. 337]; National Broa.dcasti'tlg Co. v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190, 222-223 [63 S.Ct. 997, 87 L.Ed. 1344] ;
Spri1lgerv. Philippine Islands, 277 V.S. 189, 206-207 [48
RCt. 480,72 L.Ed. 845] ; Ne'uberger v. Commissioner, 311 U.S.
83,88 [61 RCt. 97, 85 L.Ed. 58].) [9] The Secretary and
his predecessors have consistently interpreted the act as authorizing regulations with respect to referrals in the event
of labor disputes in addition to the minimum notice requirement of section 11 (b). The challenged regulation or regulations similar to it have been in effect since 1939 (see 4 Fed.
Reg. 2464 (1939));2 even as early as 1934 a regulation was
adopted substantially restricting the referral services that
would be provided by employment offices in the event of
strikes or lockouts. (United States Department of Labor,
United States Employment Service, Bulletin Number 2, Procedure for Giving Effect to the provisions of the WagnerPeyser Act regarding Strikes or Lockouts, September 15,
1934;8 see also Sanders v. United States, 60 F.Supp. 483,
491.) Consistent administrative construction of a statute over
many years, particularly when it originated with those
charged with putting the statutory machinery into effect, is
·"Sec. 21.12. Referrals in Labor Disputes. Unless otherwise provided
by State law, the State Service shall require that eaeh employment offiee
under its supervision refrain from referring any person to any position
at any place of employment where there exists a labor dispute. For the
purpose of this rule, the term 'labor dispute' shall inelude any contro·
versy eoncerning terms or eonditions of employment or concerning the
Bssoeiation or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintain·
ing, ehanging, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment
regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of employer and employee."
"This regulation provided in part:
"An opening involving a strike or lockout may be brought to the
attention of any applicant who calls voluntarily in person at an offiee
of a State employment service or of the National Reemployment Servo
ice.

"Applicants previ01ls1y registered at an employment office shall not be
requested by mail, telephone, telegraph, or other means of notification to
call at the employment office for an interview eoncerning a position in·
volt'ing a strike or lockout.
"An applicant shall not, under any cireumstanees, be referred to a
position involving a strike or lockout until he has been notified verbally
and in writing of the existence and nature of t.he dispute. The applicant
shall be required to sign acknowledgment of the written notification
before be is referred." (Italics added.)
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entitled to great weight and will not be overturned unless
clearly erroneous. (Federal Trade Com. v. Mandel Brothers,
359 U.S. 385, 391 [79 S.Ct. 818, 3 L.Ed.2d 893]; Uflited
States v. American Truckiflg Assfls., 310 U.S. 534, 549 [60
S.Ct. 1059, 84 L.Ed. 1345] ; United States v. Leslie Salt Co.,
350 U.S. 383, 396 [76 S.Ct. 416, 100 L.Ed. 441]; Great
Northern By. Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262, 275-276 [62
S.Ct. 529, 86 L.Ed. 836] ; Norwegian Nitrogefl Co. v. United
States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 [53 S.Ct. 350, 77 L.Ed. 796] ; Mazer
v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 213 [74 S.Ct. 460, 98 L.Ed. 630] ; see
1 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, § 5.06, p. 324.) We
cannot say that the Secretary or his predecessors erred in determining the scope of their rule-making power under the act
or that the regulation challenged by petitioners is invalid.
(See Ottinger v. Uflited States, 123 Ct. Cl. 23, 45-46, 106 F.
Supp. 198, 202-203; 41 Ops. U.S. Atty. Gen. No. 74 (1959).)
The appeal from the order denying leave to intervene is
dismissed. The motion to dismiss the appeal from the judgment in the Di Giorgio case is denied. The judgments are
reversed. Each party shall bear its own costs on the appeal
from the order denying leave to intervene. Appellants shall
recover their costs on the appeals from the judgments.
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., White, J., and Dooling, J., concurred.
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. I would dismiss the appeals, as
the issues which were before the trial court are now moot.
Schauer, J., concurred.
The petition of respondent Thomas C. Bowers for a rehearing was denied June 21, 1961. Schauer, J., and McComb, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be
granted.

